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in the 20th century
Damian J. Ruck1, R. Alexander Bentley2*, Daniel J. Lawson1
The decline in the everyday importance of religionwith economic development is awell-known correlation, but which
phenomenon comes first? Using unsupervised factor analysis and a birth cohort approach to create a retrospective
time series, we present 100-year time series of secularization in different nations, derived from recent global values
surveys, which we compare by decade to historical gross domestic product figures in those nations. We find evidence
that a rise in secularizationgenerally hasprecededeconomic growthover thepast century.Ourmultilevel, time-lagged
regressions also indicate that tolerance for individual rights predicted 20th century economic growth even better than
secularization. These findings hold when we control for education and shared cultural heritage. o
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 INTRODUCTION
A classic sociological question is whether the decline of religious
activity, or secularization, has been caused by economic development
(1, 2). A century ago, Durkheim (3) proposed that technological and
socioeconomic advances come to displace the functions of religion
(4, 5), whereas Weber (6) contended the opposite, that monotheistic
religion—the so-called Protestant ethic—made the development of
capitalism possible.
Although a correlation between economic development and sec-
ularization is evident, in that countries that are highly religious tend to
be the poorest (7, 8), it is not obvious which change precedes which
through time:whether development causes secularization (9, 10), or vice
versa (11), or whether both changes are driven, with different time lags,
by a factor such as education or advances in technology (2, 12).
Whereas some studies find a bicausal relationship between income
and religion (13–15), causality effectively remains unknown as feed-
backs may change through time and development. Organized religious
charity, for example, might initially encourage certain values that facil-
itate economic development while restricting individual expression
(16), but then the resulting economic development may subsequently
reward individualism. Tolerance of individual expressionmay then feed
secularism, partly by undermining religious organizations that provide
communities with resources and social capital; other causal arguments
also remain feasible (17, 18).
To characterize their temporal relationship, we use 20th century
data for both economic development and a measure of secularization
extracted from international cultural values surveys. Time-lagged re-
gressions using these 100-year time series for key variables can deter-
mine which variable precedes the other. This can be used to rule out
certain hypotheses of causality. If, for example, changes in series X pre-
cede those in series Y, then one can say that Y does not cause X even
while it is not certain that X causes Y.
For indices of cultural values, we use data from the EuropeanValues
Survey (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS) since 1990. To
estimate values from all decades of the 20th century, here, we make
use of birth cohorts (seeMaterials andMethods); the utility of this tech-
nique is among our key findings. The WVS and EVS featured some of
the same survey questions, sowe combined these survey data sets, whichwe refer to as the WEVS. The data we use for economic development
are data on historic gross domestic product (GDP) per capita from the
Maddison Project (19), which, although more complex indices such as
the Human Development Index can be preferable (20), we use because
GDP data exist for many nations over the entire 20th century. We also
include three control variables, each of which covers the set of nations
around the world and extends to the beginning of the 20th century. The
first, which recently became available, is an extensive international time
series on participation rates in tertiary education, which stretches back
to the early 20th century (21). The second is language family, which is
used as a proxy for the nested randomeffect of nonindependent cultural
and economic histories between individual countries (22). The third is a
measure of tolerance of others, extracted as a factor from theWEVS, as
discussed below.RESULTS
Having applied exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to theWEVS data set,
we selected nine factors to retain, each interpretable using questions that
did not overlap between factors (see Materials and Methods). Factor 1,
explaining 11% of the variance, was strongly loaded on questions re-
garding the importance of religion in one’s life (see Materials and
Methods). This factor defines our measure of secularization, S, as a
composite variable of WEVS responses (table S4 lists all elements of
the secularization factor).
Another factor from the EFA, factor 8, was strongly loaded on sur-
vey participants’ willingness to tolerate behaviors that are often socially
prohibited, such as suicide, homosexuality, or abortion (see table S11).
We label this factor as “tolerance,” denoted as V. We explore tolerance,
V, as a control variable in our results for two reasons. First, aswewill see,
the changes in tolerance were closely correlated with the changes in sec-
ularism during the 20th century. Second, the tolerance factor was
strongly correlated (R = 0.59) with Hofstede’s (23) metric of individ-
ualism (we did not extract individualism directly from Hofstede’s data
because it is not broken down by birth cohort as we require).
Having extracted these factors measuring secularization, S, and tol-
erance,V, we aim to extend the information collected in theWEVSdur-
ing the last quarter-century back to the beginning of the 20th century.
Todo this, we treat decade of birth, t, recorded for eachperson surveyed,
as a proxy for a historical time period. Although there will be differences
from one survey period, p, to the next, the differences apply across all
birth cohorts such that the relative differences between birth cohorts
were generally maintained through time (5).1 of 7
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L E
 o
n
 J
http://advances.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 Using a likelihood ratio test of the hypotheses presented inMaterials
and Methods, we confirm that estimates for each birth decade, t, are
independent of survey period, p, in that there is no evidence of temporal
dependence for St,p or for Vt,p in 91% and 89% of the countries tested,
respectively (table S13 shows full results). This confirms that genera-
tional trends persist through time. The results make up the elements
of an array, Si,t,p, of estimates of secularization in each country, i, during
birth decade, t, for survey period, p.
Next, we determined secularization by birth decade in each country,
Si,t, by averaging factor 1 across all available survey periods, p, in
country, i, corresponding to decade of birth, t. Figure 1 illustrates the
temporal trend in secularization across birth decade for several
countries with little missing data: Great Britain, the Philippines, Chile,
and Nigeria. For countries with missing data, missing values of Si,t
were imputed (see Materials and Methods). The same procedure is
used to obtain the tolerance score matrix Vi,t.
We compared Si,t versus historical GDP per capita (in 1990 US$)
from each country through time. Figure 2 compares Si,t versus the
decadal mean GDP, GDPi,t, for the same four countries as Fig. 1. We
find evidence that changes in secularization, Si,t, precede changes in
GDPi,t, as most clearly seen in reversals of the trend, when a decrease
in S occurs shortly before a corresponding decrease in GDP.
To test whether changes in Si,t generally precede changes in GDPi,t,
or vice versa, we estimate multilevel time-lagged regressions. By includ-
ing data from all countries in a single test, a multilevel model can max-
imize the statistical power available in these data. It also allows us to
control for non-independence due to shared cultural heritage h, which
we do by classifying countries by language family (see Materials and
Methods). The multilevel model is
St
e
Sty þ GDPty þ ð1jhiÞ þ D ð1Þ
GDPt
e
GDPty þ Sty þ ð1jhiÞ þ D ð2ÞRuck et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaar8680 18 July 2018where St and GDPt are secularization and economic development in
decade t, respectively, and St−y and GDPt−y are the respective values
lagged by y decades. The term hi represents a nested random effect
due to the cultural-historic grouping of country i, for which language
family is the proxy (22). This term is used as a control for non-
independent similarities between individual countries, due to their de-
velopment and secularization already present at the start of the
20th century.
Models 2 and 5 (Table 1) show that changes in St precede those of
GDPt and not the other way around. This directionality is independent
of time lag, y, as the full results for lags of one decade, two decades, and
three decades show (table S13). An increase in St by 1 SD corresponds to
$1000 increase in GDPt per capita after 10 years, $2800 after 20 years,
and $5000 after 30 years. Our robustness checks show that this result is
stable (seeMaterials andMethods). It is independent of the age we con-
sider a birth cohort economically active (table S15).
Next, we tested whether the tolerance factor, V, offers any explana-
tory value, by adding it as a control in Eqs. 1 and 2 (see Materials and
Methods). Model 8 in Table 1 shows thatV is not predictive of future S,
but model 11 shows thatV is a better explanation of future GDP than
S. This result is independent of time lag, an increase of 1 SD inV results
in a $900 increase inGDPt per capita after 10 years, $3200 after 20 years,
and $4400 after 30 years (see table S14).
The top row of Fig. 3 compares the relationship between St and
GDPt in the 1910s and the 1990s, along with the evolution of this rela-
tionship during the 20th century. Whereas there was no relationship in
the 1910s, a strong relationship had formulated by the 1990s; secular-
ization explained only 4% of the variance in global development in the
1910s, but explained 40% in the 1990s. This contrasts with the 20th cen-
tury relationship between St and Vt (Fig. 3, bottom row), in that they
were already related in the 1910s—St explained 36% of the variance
in Vt in the 1910s—which since increased to 72% by the 1990s. This
suggests that the relationship between secularization and economic de-
velopment did not exist during the 19th century and that the relation-
ship between tolerance and secularization probably did.uly 20, 2018Fig. 1. Temporal trends in secularization versus economic development over
the 20th century, for four illustrative countries. Each panel represents a coun-
try’s secularization score S derived from the WEVS on the y axis, for birth cohorts
by decade t on the x axis. The trends are independently determined from each of
five different survey periods, p, corresponding to five waves of the WEVS: p1,
1990–1994; p2, 1995–1999; p3, 2000–2004; p4, 2005–2009; p5, 2010–2014.tt
t
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Fig. 2. Time series of secularization versus GDP per capita, from four illustrative
countries, over the20th century. Each red line represents the mean secularization
score, St, of the birth cohort in decade, t, for that country. Each blue line repre-
sents the mean GDP per capita (normalized to 1990 US$) during decade t in that
country.2 of 7
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 Having ruled out economic development as a plausible cause for
secularization, we test the effect of education, using a new interna-
tional data set on enrollment in tertiary education since the 19th century
(21).We added education as a control in Eqs. 1 and 2 (seeMaterials and
Methods). The results show that higher education is a good predictor ofRuck et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaar8680 18 July 2018futureGDPbut not of future secularization (Table 1,models 14 and 17).
These results are robust to different time lags (see table S14).
To test noise effects in the EFA, we repeated the analysis by re-
defining St using an average of six subjectively identified variables.
The results were the same (table S16).DISCUSSION
In this study, we have shown that, across a diversity of countries around
theworld, changes in secularizationpredicted changes inGDPworldwide
during the 20th century. More broadly, this implies that changes in the
everyday importance of religious practices preceded changes in economic
development in the 20th century.While this does not yet isolate one path
of causality, it determines that economic growth is not what caused sec-
ularization in the past. Our observation that secularization preceded
economic change further rules out a bicausal relationship between
income and religion (13–15) as well as the theory that socioeconomic
advances cause religious practices to be phased out (3, 4, 17).
Our findings do not mean, however, that secularization was the
ultimate cause of economic development. Both secularization and eco-
nomic growth may have been driven by something else, with secular-
ization responding faster than GDP. This likely rules out technological
advances as the ultimate cause, as it is hard to imagine how religion
could respond faster to technological change than GDP.
Tolerance of individual rights appears to be closer to an ultimate
driver, in that more people are included in economic activity, especially
women (24, 25). The tolerance factor, which is most highly loaded on
individual rights for divorce and abortion (table S11) and therefore likely
to correlate with women’s rights generally, was a better temporal pre-
dictor of GDP per capita than the secularization factor. Although tem-
poral changes in tolerance and in secularization were synchronous,Table 1. Selected time-lagged linear regressions (labeled models M2, M5, etc.) between secularization (S), development (GDP), tolerance (V ), and
education (E). The time lag is y = 2 decades in all cases (results for y = 1, 2, and 3 decades in table S14). SEs, in parentheses, were determined from the inverse
of the negative Hessian matrix (44). N is the number of data points for each autoregression, n is the number of countries included in the data set, i is the
percentage of residual variance explained by the random effect (country), and h is the percentage explained by cultural heritage. R2 is the total variance
explained. Bonferroni-corrected significance: *P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ****P < 0.01.Model M2 M5 M8 M11 M14 M17Variable S GDP S GDP S GDPFixed effectGDPt−2 −0.02 (0.03) 0.87 (0.04)*** −0.01 (0.03) 0.78 (0.04)*** −0.04 (0.05) 0.83 (0.05)***St−2 0.97 (0.02)*** 0.28 (0.03)**** 0.99 (0.04)*** 0.01 (0.04) 0.97 (0.02)*** 0.22 (0.02)***Vt−2 −0.02 (0.03) 0.32 (0.04)***Et−2 0.14 (0.2) 0.97 (0.19)***Random effecti 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.16***h 0.14*** 0.12* 0.14*** 0.1 0.12* 0.09SummaryR2 0.99 0.89 0.99 0.9 0.99 0.91N 324 469 324 469 274 382n 95 101 95 101 69 70Fig. 3. Emergence of the correlation between secularization and develop-
ment during the 20th century. The top left panel shows scatter plots for secu-
larization, St, against log GDPt per capita (normalized to 1990 US$), for people
born in 1910 and 1990, where each point is a country. The top right panel shows
R2 values for GDPt versus St, for the decades of the 20th century, t. The bottom left
panel shows the same scatter-country plot for St against Vt for people born in the
1910s and the 1990s. The bottom left panel shows the progression of this corre-
lation through the decades of the 20th century.3 of 7
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 secularization did not predict increased GDP in the absence of accom-
panying increases in tolerance. The tolerance factor also correlates with
Hofstede’s individualism, which “has a strong and robust effect on log
GDP per capita,” according to other studies (26).
Besides tolerance, education is a possible driver of both economic
development and secularization. Our results showed that education is
predictive of future GDP, but not of future secularization. This is con-
sistent with other findings (2, 12) and also with religious countries tend-
ing to have high support for science education (17). In nations where
secular government programs gradually replace religious institutions as
provider of education and social welfare, changes in education would
tend to be subsequent (27, 28).
Methodologically, our unsupervised approach to theWEVSdata set,
combined with the use of birth cohorts to extend the temporal reach of
these data, is different from previous studies. Our analysis required new
methods of unsupervised factor analysis and extraction of a century of
temporal change from a much more recent data set. The evidence was
derived by comparing, for different countries, historical GDP versus
multifactor measures of personal values extracted and extrapolated
from 25 years of the WEVS into a set of 100-year time series both for
economic development and for a measure of secularization.
Previous studies have mainly focused on how education or personal
income correlates with measures of religiosity such as church attend-
ance in Western and/or European countries (9, 12–14, 28, 29). Rather
than choosing WEVS questions assumed a priori to cover religion ex-
clusively (10), we used EFA to allow the patterns of variation to emerge
from all the WEVS data. Previous studies also tend to cover a relatively
short time span. In contrast, our use of unsupervised factor analysis,
from five waves of all available countries in theWVS, allows comparison
of a century of change in cultural values across multiple non-Western
religions and cultures. Specifically, we were able to test whether GDP
per capita in decade t predicts the secular values of people born in
subsequent decades.
Using birth year data from theWEVS, we find that the average value
of our extracted factors, such as secularization or tolerance of divorce,
abortion, and homosexuality, has coherence that distinguishes one gen-
eration from another through time. That is, the persistence of genera-
tional values is consistent with both the theory that intergenerational
change is a coherent mode of value change (5, 17) and the theory that
demographic shifts, rather than economics, drive modern cultural
change (1).
Because religious beliefs and practices are culturally inherited (30),
there may be positive feedback in secularization among generations
raised with reduced exposure to religious practices (28, 29). These gen-
erational patterns affirm that cultural values change at the population
scale; this is consistent with, for example,WEVS evidence for accultura-
tion of migrants on a time scale on the order of a decade (31, 32).
Controlling for shared history did not substantially alter our findings,
which accords with the observed correlations being either negligible
or already very old by the start of the 20th century. The correlation be-
tween economic development and secularization, robust by the end of
the 20th century, did not yet exist at the beginning of the 20th century
(Fig. 3). In contrast, given the persistence of traditional values (7, 33)
and specifically the deep ancestry of religious prohibition and coopera-
tion (4, 34), the relationship between secularization and tolerance could
be ancient, and we observe this already by the early 20th century.
The pace of change and its causality are important dimensions for
future study. Studies of deep “cultural ancestry” on a time scale of cen-
turies or millennia (30, 35) have suggested, for instance, that ancientRuck et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaar8680 18 July 2018religious practices preceded the subsequent development of socio-
economic stratification (36). In the 21st century, however, cultural
transmission has been accelerated and reconfigured by technological
changes (33), and future tipping points may not be readily predicted
from 20th century trends (1). Acceptance of gay marriage in Western
countries, for example, reached 85% by 2017 among religiously un-
affiliated Americans (37). In sub-Saharan Africa, people describing re-
ligion as their only belief systemdeclined gradually from 75 to 13% over
the 20th century (38), and certain regions have seen recent abrupt de-
clines in female genital modification (35). These unanticipated changes
remind us to be open to unprecedented causal pathways between devel-
opment, religion, and tolerance in the future.MATERIALS AND METHODS
We used the WEVS data in three steps. First, we used EFA to auto-
matically extract cultural “factors” from the last five waves of theWEVS
data, collected between 1990 and 2014, yielding nine major factors as
linear combinations of survey question responses. Rather than defining
secularization in terms of a narrow variable such as low church attend-
ance (9, 13, 29), or constrained toWestern-Christian countries (13, 28),
we used a multi-item composite variable (10) to capture secularization
as reduced importance of religion in people’s values across a diversity of
cultures and religions in the sample of 109 nations represented in the
sample.
Second, we used birth years of survey respondents to extract esti-
mates of value change over the entire 20th century. On the basis of ob-
servations that an individual’s formative years are a good predictor of
relative lifetime values (5, 39), we subdivided theWEVS data by decade
of birth to estimate values in decades predating theWEVS surveys. Be-
cause formative years may vary, we systematically tested three regres-
sions: one assuming that the formative years are in the first decade of life
(childhood), another assuming the second decade (teenage years), and
another assuming the third (young adult). In all cases, our tests con-
firmed that decade of birth had a marked influence on our measure
of secularization, andwe studied time-seriated data across 109 countries
and the 10 decades of the 20th century.
Third, we looked at how the 10-decade time series of secularization
in each country relates to the record of change in GDP during the cor-
responding period.With respect to the well-known difficulties in estab-
lishing causation with observational data (9, 10, 28), here, we only say
that changes in certain variables precede others, which can nevertheless
rule out specific models of causation in favor of others.
Cultural values surveys
The WVS (worldvaluessurvey.org) was administered to cumulatively
329,723 participants in six waves, in all nations accessible at the time
of eachwave, through a questionnaire administered through individual,
face-to-face interviews in local languages. The WVS contains about
150 questions relating to cultural values, plus additional questions to
collect demographic information. The WVS was carried out in almost
100 countries. At least 1000 people from each country were surveyed
using a stratified sampling method to ensure a fair demographic re-
presentation (7).
The WVS was carried out in five waves since 1990, with one
administered every 5 years. In early WVS waves, the populations of
India, China, Nigeria, rural areas, and illiterate populationwere under-
sampled. Out of the 150 cultural value questions, 64 are common to all
five waves since 1990 (table S3) and make up the core questions that4 of 7
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 are the focus of our analysis. As the questions varied in form (some
binary, someLikert scale), we then recoded theWVSdata by normalizing
all scores to mean of zero across the whole WVS and set the variance to
unity so that the variances are comparable. Missing data were limited, so
missing values could be mean imputed without introducing bias.
The EVS contains the same core 64 questions found in theWVS, so
the combined data set WEVS comprises these questions. The EVS
covers 48 European countries (one EVS wave also included the United
States). This increases the total number of unique countries to 109
(table S2).
Exploratory factor analysis
We identified nine distinct cultural factors in the WEVS data using
EFA, which assumes that each observed variable in the data set is a
weighted linear combination of hidden factors (40)
yn ¼ wn;1F1 þ wn;2F2 þ…þ wn;mFm þ Dn ð3Þ
where yn is observed variable n, Fm is hidden factorm, wn,m is the con-
tribution of factor Fm to variable yn, and Dn is the residual for variable n.
This model was fit to the data using maximum likelihood. Nine factors
were chosen based on the “Very Simple Structure” criterion (41), which
maximizes the simple structure of the factor loading matrix for ease of
interpretation.
Of these nine factors (see tables S4 to S12 for loadings), we focus on
two, which we designated for each country i as secularization (St) and
tolerance of behavioral norms such as homosexuality and abortion (Vt).
The secularization factor was the one that explained the most variance
in the EFA, and this factor was highly loaded uponWVS questions in-
cluding “How important in your life is religion?,” “How important is
God in your life?,” “Are you a religious person?,” “How often do you
attend religious services,?” “How much confidence do you have in the
Church?,” and “Is religious faith an important quality to instill in a
child?” Tolerance, Vt, was highly loaded upon questions concerning
the respondents’ attitude toward homosexuality, divorce, suicide, and
abortion.
Economic development (historic GDP data)
We used historical data on GDP per capita (in 1990 US$) for the
20th century (1900–2000) provided by the Maddison Project (19). Be-
cause our WEVS analysis was resolved by decade, we correspondingly
averaged the observed GDP per capita by decade from 1900 to 2010.
Only six countries in theWEVS were not present in theMaddison data
(Northern Ireland,Malta, Luxembourg, Iceland, Andorra, andCyprus),
yielding 103 countries with 11-point time series for GDP per capita.
Historical GDP data are missing for certain countries, such as sub-
Saharan Africa (for example, Nigeria and Burkina Faso) and former
Soviet states (for example, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia). For historical
continuity, the following countries were considered the same: Cape
Colony has been equated with South Africa, Holland with the Nether-
lands, Eritreawith Ethiopia, north and central Italy with Italy, andGreat
Britain and England with the United Kingdom.
Tertiary education enrollment
We used tertiary education enrollment rates as a proxy measurement
for science education. The “Barro-Lee Educational Attainment” data set
gives time series for tertiary enrollment, taken mainly from census data
and from intergovernmental organizations, and stretches back to 1820Ruck et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaar8680 18 July 2018in the most recent edition (21). We took the average rate of enrollment
in each decade to correspond to the cultural values data, which is in
decadal increments. The coverage is less comprehensive than the
WEVS, with only 74 countries covered. Data for most non-Russian
former Soviet states are missing because most were not independent
states formost of the 20th century; the same is true for Yugoslavia. Some
small countries or semiautonomous regions of another country are also
missing, such as Northern Ireland. Finally, poorer countries—mainly
Islamic or African ones—are missing because tertiary educational en-
rollment statistics could not be obtained.
Language categories (proxy for cultural relatedness)
To avoid Galton’s problem, we have to control for shared culture.
Often, this is done using language phylogenies (22), but this requires
all societies under study to be from the same language tree with the re-
quisite branch lengths calculated (42). The countries in our global
sample speak languages from many different language families, which
rules out the use of phylogenetic trees. To control for cultural history, h,
in the time-lagged regressions, we discretely categorized the countries
based on language families and treat it as a random effect. These data
were taken from the Ethnologue database (43), which documents all
known extant languages, and the countries in which they are currently
the predominant language. The 109 countries were categorized into the
following language families (number of countries): Albanian (2), Semitic
(17), Italic (23), Greek-Armenian (3), Germanic (23), Turkic (6), Indo-
Aryan (4), Balto-Slavic (14), Sino-Tibetan (3), Uralic (3), Kartvelian (1),
Austronesian (3), Japonic (1), Niger-Congo (3), Korean (1), Tai (1), and
Austroasiatic (1). Table S17 contains the language group assigned to
each country.
Use of birth cohort to extend data set through time
TheWVS component of the combinedWEVS data set was carried out
during five distinct “waves,” carried out at approximately 5-year in-
tervals, between 1990 and 2015. This provides a maximum of five
data points per country (not all countries participated in all five waves)
in a time series reaching back only 25 years. Given the recorded decade
of birth of the survey respondents, however, we can, by assumptions
confirmed below, extend these data back to represent all decades of
the 20th century. This yields amatrix St,p of values for each country,with
decade of birth, t, and survey period, p, as the rows and columns, respec-
tively (for inclusion, a birth cohort must contain at least 100 individ-
uals). To account for birth cohorts that are not represented in all time
periods, which could otherwise bias the mean across time periods, we
imputed the missing values using the following linear model
St;p ¼ mp þ apt ð4Þ
where t is the birth decade, p is the survey period, and mp and a are the
estimated slope and intercept, respectively, for imputation of the
missing value(s). Once missing values were imputed, we then defined
St for each birth decade, t, as the mean across all survey periods, p. The
result is a 10-point time series over the past century (rather than 5points
over 25 years) for the 109 countries in the WEVS, with some countries
having only partially complete time series (for example,Nigeria has data
from only seven decades). Importantly though, these values should not
be interpreted as the true values, which would have been measured had
theWEVS existed in earlier decades of the 20th century, except possibly
when no period effect is present.5 of 7
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 We tested the preservation of generational trends in cultural values
(5) by using a likelihood ratio test to determine whether an interaction
term between birth decade and survey period provides explanatory
value for the data. Specifically
H0 : St;p ¼ a0 þ a1t þ ∑
i¼P
2
aiPi þ D ð5Þ
H1 : St;p ¼ b0 þ b1t þ ∑
i¼P
2
biPi þ ∑
j¼P
2
bjþPPjt þ D ð6Þ
where St,p is secularization, but could also be tolerance of homo-
sexuality and abortion Vt,p. Each country was subjected to this test.
We reported the likelihood ratio and the proportion of the variance
explained by H1, not explained by H0. Further, using the c
2 dis-
tribution, we calculated asymptotic significance values to quantify
the evidence that H1 was a better explanation for the WEVS data
than H0, that is, whether estimates for each birth decade t were
independent of survey period p. This test was carried out for 79 countries
because we were limited to those who appeared in two ormore waves of
the WEVS.
Multilevel time-lagged linear regressions
We chose a time-lagged model to express secularization (St) as a
function of historical development (GDPt−y) while controlling for his-
torical secularization data (St−y), where y is the lag in decades. Unlike a
standard time-lag test, however, which normally requires two long in-
dividual time series, we havemany time series (103 countries) that have
10 points or fewer (limited to number of decades in the 20th century).
To control for cultural non-independence between countries, which is a
nested random effect, we categorized countries by language family—as
the best available proxy for cultural similarity—designated by variable hi
for country i. This amounted to two nested random effects for each de-
signated cultural heritage h, within each country i. To avoid multiple
testing and low statistical power, we formulated a multilevel model to
incorporate data from all countries into a single test
St
e
Sty þ GDPty þ ð1jhiÞ þ D ð7Þ
where (1|hi) is the nested random effect for a country i from language
category h, D is the error, and we let y = 1, 2, or 3 decades. Using the
control variable, hi, present in all of the time-lagged equations (Eqs. 1,
2, 7, and 12), we found that this nested random effect did not sub-
stantially change our results (Table 1 and tables S14 to S17). This indi-
cated that religious change predicted economic change while controlling
for language as a proxy for shared history.
To deal with missing data in the GDPt and/or St time series for
certain countries, we chose to omit the missing values rather than
attempt to impute them without an obvious universal model to de-
scribe how secularization or GDP changes. However, despite omitting
variables, we still obtained sizable contributions from themajor cultural
groups (except for the ex-Soviet states that lack credible GDP data
before 1990). We also reported the number of countries represented
in the data and the number of total data points; both depended on
the time lag used.Ruck et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : eaar8680 18 July 2018To test the alternative hypothesis that economic development pre-
cedes secularization, we ran a similar test to see whether St in a birth
cohort predicted GDP y decades later
GDPt
e
GDPty þ Sty þ ð1jhiÞ þ D ð8Þ
Wealso tested the effect of tolerance of behaviors such as homosexuality
and abortion, V, on either S or GDP. We added V as a control in the
time-lagged regressions
St
e
Sty þ GDPty þ Vty þ ð1jhiÞ þ D ð9Þ
GDPt
e
GDPty þ Sty þ Vty þ ð1jhiÞ þ D ð10Þ
We also wanted to test the effect of advanced education E, so we simi-
larly added a variable representing the tertiary education enrollment
rate. Once again, testing a lag of y = 1, 2, or 3 decades
St
e
Sty þ GDPty þ Ety þ ð1jhiÞ þ D ð11Þ
GDPt
e
GDPty þ Sty þ Ety þ ð1jhiÞ þ D ð12Þ
We normalized St and Vt so that the SD of each is equal to 1. This
allowed us to state the dollar improvement in GDP resulting from
1 SD change in both St and Vt.
Robustness checks
When comparing GDP data versus our estimates of secularization (St)
for given birth decade, t, wemake no assumption about the age at which
a birth cohort begins to affect the economy; economic development can
affect cultural values during formative years, whereas people will not
normally influence the economy until they are older. To ensure that
our results are robust to this uncertainty, we ran the S-GDP regressions
considering coincidence points between development and seculariza-
tion in birth cohorts: childhood (+0), teenage years (+10), and twenties
(+20). The results in table S15 show that, under all of these scenarios,
secularization precedes economic development and not the other way
around.
We also tested the robustness of our multilevel, time-lagged regres-
sions to ensure that random noise in the EFA factors did not affect the
regression results. To do this, instead of defining secularization with
EFA factors, we defined secularization as the simplemeanof six relevant
WEVS variables (see table S16), each normalized tomean zero and unit
variance. We found that the predictive structure that emerges (table
S16) is the same as when we used the factors derived through EFA.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
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